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photons, are used to transmit digital information, the un-
certainty principle gives rise to novel cryptographic phe-
nomena unachievable with traditional transmission media, 
e.g. a communications channel on which it is impossible 
in principle to eavesdrop without a high probability of dis-
turbing the transmission in such a way as to be detected. 
Such a quantum channel can be used in conjunction with 
ordinary insecure classical channels to distribute random 
key information between two users with the assurance 
that it remains unknown to anyone else, even when the 
users share no secret information initially. We also present 
a protocol for coin-tossing by exchange of quantum mes-
sages, which is secure against traditional kinds of cheating, 
even by an opponent with unlimited computing power, but 
ironically can be subverted by use of a still subtler quan-
tum phenomenon, the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen paradox.
I. Introduction
Conventional cryptosystems such as ENIGMA, DES, or 
even RSA, are based on a mixture of guesswork and math-
ematics. Information theory shows that traditional secret-
key cryptosystems cannot be totally secure unless the key, 
used once only, is at least as long as the cleartext. On the 
other hand, the theory of computational complexity is not 
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yet well enough understood to prove the computational se-
curity of public-key cryptosystems.
In this paper we use a radically different foundation 
for cryptography, viz. the uncertainty principle of quantum 
physics. In conventional information theory and cryptog-
raphy, it is taken for granted that digital communications 
in principle can always be passively monitored or copied, 
even by someone ignorant of their meaning. However, 
when information is encoded in non-orthogonal quantum 
states, such as single photons with polarization directions 
0, 45, 90, and 135 degrees, one obtains a communica-
tions channel whose transmissions in principle cannot be 
read or copied reliably by an eavesdropper ignorant of cer-
tain key information used in forming the transmission. The 
eavesdropper cannot even gain partial information about 
such a transmission without altering it in a random and 
uncontrollable way likely to be detected by the channel’s 
legitimate users.
Quantum coding was ﬁrst described in [W], along with 
two applications: making money that is in principle im-
possible to counterfeit, and multiplexing two or three mes-
sages in such a way that reading one destroys the others. 
More recently [BBBW], quantum coding has been used in 
conjunction with public key cryptographic techniques to 
yield several schemes for unforgeable subway tokens. Here 
we show that quantum coding by itself achieves one of the 
main advantages of public key cryptography by permitting 
secure distribution of random key information between 
parties who share no secret information initially, provided 
the parties have access, besides the quantum channel, to 
an ordinary channel susceptible to passive but not active 
eavesdropping. Even in the presence of active eavesdrop-
ping, the two parties can still distribute key securely if 
they share some secret information initially, provided the 
eavesdropping is not so active as to suppress communi-
cations completely. We also present a protocol for coin 
tossing by exchange of quantum messages. Except where 
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otherwise noted the protocols are provably secure even 
against an opponent with superior technology and unlim-
ited computing power, barring fundamental violations of 
accepted physical laws.
Offsetting these advantages is the practical disadvan-
tage that quantum transmissions are necessarily very weak 
and cannot be ampliﬁed in transit. Moreover, quantum 
cryptography does not provide digital signatures, or ap-
plications such as certiﬁed mail or the ability to settle 
disputes before a judge.
II. Essential properties of polarized photons
Polarized light can be produced by sending an ordinary 
light beam through a polarizing apparatus such as a Po-
laroid ﬁlter or calcite crystal; the beam’s polarization axis 
is determined by the orientation of the polarizing appara-
tus in which the beam originates. Generating single polar-
ized photons is also possible, in principle by picking them 
out of a polarized beam, and in practice by a variation of 
an experiment [AGR] of Aspect et al.
Although polarization is a continuous variable, the un-
certainty principle forbids measurements on any single 
photon from revealing more than one bit about its po-
larization. For example, if a light beam with polarization 
axis α is sent into a ﬁlter oriented at angle β , the indi-
vidual photons behave dichotomously and probabilistically, 
being transmitted with probability cos2(α − β) and ab-
sorbed with the complementary probability sin2(α − β). 
The photons behave deterministically only when the two 
axes are parallel (certain transmission) or perpendicular 
(certain absorption).
If the two axes are not perpendicular, so that some pho-
tons are transmitted, one might hope to learn additional 
information about α by measuring the transmitted pho-
tons again with a polarizer oriented at some third angle; 
but this is to no avail, because the transmitted photons, 
in passing through the β polarizer, emerge with exactly β
polarization, having lost all memory of their previous po-
larization α.
Another way one might hope to learn more than one 
bit from a single photon would be not to measure it di-
rectly, but rather somehow amplify it into a clone of iden-
tically polarized photons, then perform measurements on 
these; but this hope is also vain, because such cloning can 
be shown to be inconsistent with the foundations of quan-
tum mechanics [WZ].
Formally, quantum mechanics represents the internal 
state of a quantum system (e.g. the polarization of a pho-
ton) as a vector ψ of unit length in a linear space H
over the ﬁeld of complex numbers (Hilbert space). The in-
ner product of two vectors 〈φ | ψ〉 is deﬁned as ∑ j φ∗j ψ j , 
where ∗ indicates complex conjugation. The dimensionality 
of the Hilbert space depends on the system, being larger 
(or even inﬁnite) for more complicated systems. Each phys-
ical measurement M that might be performed on the sys-
tem corresponds to a resolution of its Hilbert space into or-
thogonal subspaces, one for each possible outcome of the 
measurement. The number of possible outcomes is thus 
limited to the dimensionality d of the Hilbert space, the 
most complete measurements being those that resolve the 
Hilbert space into d 1-dimensional subspaces.
Let Mk represent the projection operator onto the kth
subspace of measurement M , so that the identity oper-
ator on H can be represented as a sum of projections: 
I = M1 + M2 + . . . . When a system in state ψ is subjected 
to measurement M , its behavior is in general probabilistic: 
outcome k occurs with a probability equal to |Mkψ |2, the 
square of the length of the state vector’s projection into 
subspace Mk . After the measurement, the system is left in 
a new state Mkψ/|Mkψ |, which is the normalized unit vec-
tor in the direction of the old state vector’s projection into 
subspace Mk . The measurement thus has a deterministic 
outcome, and leaves the state vector unmodiﬁed, only in 
the exceptional case that the initial state vector happens 
to lie entirely in one of the orthogonal subspaces charac-
terizing the measurement.
The Hilbert space for a single polarized photon is 
2-dimensional; thus the state of a photon may be com-
pletely described as a linear combination of, for example, 
the two unit vectors r1 = (1, 0) and r2 = (0, 1), repre-
senting respectively horizontal and vertical polarization. In 
particular, a photon polarized at angle α to the horizontal 
is described by the state vector (cosα, sinα). When sub-
jected to a measurement of vertical-vs.-horizontal polariza-
tion, such a photon in effect chooses to become horizontal 
with probability cos2 α and vertical with probability sin2 α. 
The two orthogonal vectors r1 and r2 thus exemplify the 
resolution of a 2-dimensional Hilbert space into 2 orthogo-
nal 1-dimensional subspaces; henceforth r1 and r2 will be 
said to comprise the ‘rectilinear’ basis for the Hilbert space.
An alternative basis for the same Hilbert space is pro-
vided by the two ‘diagonal’ basis vectors d1 =
(0.707, 0.707), representing a 45-degree photon, and d2 =
(0.707, −0.707), representing a 135-degree photon. Two 
bases (e.g. rectilinear and diagonal) are said to be ‘con-
jugate’ [W] if each vector of one basis has equal-length 
projections onto all vectors of the other basis: this means 
that a system prepared in a speciﬁc state of one basis will 
behave entirely randomly, and lose all its stored informa-
tion, when subjected to a measurement corresponding to 
the other basis. Owing to the complex nature of its coef-
ﬁcients, the two-dimensional Hilbert space also admits a 
third basis conjugate to both the rectilinear and diagonal 
bases, comprising the two so-called ‘circular’ polarizations 
c1 = (0.707, 0.707i) and c2 = (0.707i, 0.707); but the rec-
tilinear and diagonal bases are all that will be needed for 
the cryptographic applications in this paper.
The Hilbert space for a compound system is constructed 
by taking the tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of its 
components; thus the state of a pair of photons is char-
acterized by a unit vector in the 4-dimensional Hilbert 
space spanned by the orthogonal basis vectors r1r1, r1r2, 
r2r1, and r2r2. This formalism entails that the state of a 
compound system is not generally expressible as the carte-
sian product of the states of its parts: e.g. the Einstein–
Podolsky–Rosen state of two photons, 0.7071(r1r2 − r2r1), 
to be discussed later, is not equivalent to any product of 
one-photon states.
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III. Quantum public key distribution
In traditional public-key cryptography, trapdoor func-
tions are used to conceal the meaning of messages be-
tween two users from a passive eavesdropper, despite the 
lack of any initial shared secret information between the 
two users. In quantum public key distribution, the quan-
tum channel is not used directly to send meaningful mes-
sages, but is rather used to transmit a supply of random 
bits between two users who share no secret information 
initially, in such a way that the users, by subsequent con-
sultation over an ordinary non-quantum channel subject 
to passive eavesdropping, can tell with high probability 
whether the original quantum transmission has been dis-
turbed in transit, as it would be by an eavesdropper (it 
is the quantum channel’s peculiar virtue to compel eaves-
dropping to be active). If the transmission has not been 
disturbed, they agree to use these shared secret bits in the 
well-known way as a one-time pad to conceal the meaning 
of subsequent meaningful communications, or for other 
cryptographic applications (e.g. authentication tags) requir-
ing shared secret random information. If transmission has 
been disturbed, they discard it and try again, deferring 
any meaningful communications until they have succeeded 
in transmitting enough random bits through the quantum 
channel to serve as a one-time pad.
In more detail one user (‘Alice’) chooses a random bit 
string and a random sequence of polarization bases (rec-
tilinear or diagonal). She then sends the other user (‘Bob’) 
a train of photons, each representing one bit of the string 
in the basis chosen for that bit position, a horizontal or 
45-degree photon standing for a binary zero and a verti-
cal or 135-degree photon standing for a binary 1. As Bob 
receives the photons he decides, randomly for each pho-
ton and independently of Alice, whether to measure the 
photon’s rectilinear polarization or its diagonal polariza-
tion, and interprets the result of the measurement as a 
binary zero or one. As explained in the previous section a 
random answer is produced and all information lost when 
one attempts to measure the rectilinear polarization of a 
diagonal photon, or vice versa. Thus Bob obtains meaning-
ful data from only half the photons he detects—those for 
which he guessed the correct polarization basis. Bob’s in-
formation is further degraded by the fact that, realistically, 
some of the photons would be lost in transit or would fail 
to be counted by Bob’s imperfectly-eﬃcient detectors.
Subsequent steps of the protocol take place over an 
ordinary public communications channel, assumed to be 
susceptible to eavesdropping but not to the injection or 
alteration of messages. Bob and Alice ﬁrst determine, by 
public exchange of messages, which photons were success-
fully received and of these which were received with the 
correct basis. If the quantum transmission has been undis-
turbed, Alice and Bob should agree on the bits encoded by 
these photons, even though this data has never been dis-
cussed over the public channel. Each of these photons, in 
other words, presumably carries one bit of random infor-
mation (e.g. whether a rectilinear photon was vertical or 
horizontal) known to Alice and Bob but to no one else.
Because of the random mix of rectilinear and diagonal 
photons in the quantum transmission, any eavesdropping 
carries the risk of altering the transmission in such a way 
as to produce disagreement between Bob and Alice on 
some of the bits on which they think they should agree. 
Speciﬁcally, it can be shown that no measurement on a 
photon in transit, by an eavesdropper who is informed of 
the photon’s original basis only after he has performed 
his measurement, can yield more than 1/2 expected bits 
of information about the key bit encoded by that pho-
ton; and that any such measurement yielding b bits of 
expected information (b ≤ 1/2) must induce a disagree-
ment with probability at least b/2 if the measured photon, 
or an attempted forgery of it, is later re-measured in its 
original basis. (This optimum tradeoff occurs, for example, 
when the eavesdropper measures and retransmits all in-
tercepted photons in the rectilinear basis, thereby learning 
the correct polarizations of half the photons and inducing 
disagreements in 1/4 of those that are later re-measured 
in the original basis.)
Alice and Bob can therefore test for eavesdropping by 
publicly comparing some of the bits on which they think 
they should agree, though of course this sacriﬁces the se-
crecy of these bits. The bit positions used in this com-
parison should be a random subset (say one third) of the 
correctly received bits, so that eavesdropping on more than 
a few photons is unlikely to escape detection. If all the 
comparisons agree, Alice and Bob can conclude that the 
quantum transmission has been free of signiﬁcant eaves-
dropping, and those of the remaining bits that were sent 
and received with the same basis also agree, and can safely 
be used as a one-time pad for subsequent secure commu-
nications over the public channel. When this one-time pad 
is used up, the protocol is repeated to send a new body of 
random information over the quantum channel.
The following example illustrates the above protocol.
QUANTUM TRANSMISSION
Alice’s random bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
Random sending bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D R D R R R R R D D R D D D R
Photons Alice sends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ⤡  ⤢ ↔   ↔ ↔ ⤢ ⤡  ⤢ ⤡ ⤡ 
Random receiving bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R D D R R D D R D R D D D D R
Bits as received by Bob . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
PUBLIC DISCUSSION
Bob reports bases of received bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R D R D D R R D D D R
Alice says which bases were correct . . . . . . . . . . . . . OK OK OK OK OK OK
Presumably shared information (if no eavesdrop) 1 1 0 1 0 1
Bob reveals some key bits at random . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0
Alice conﬁrms them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OK OK
OUTCOME
Remaining shared secret bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 1 1
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The need for the public (non-quantum) channel in 
this scheme to be immune to active eavesdropping can 
be relaxed if Alice and Bob have agreed beforehand on 
a small secret key, which they use to create Wegman–
Carter authentication tags [WC] for their messages over 
the public channel. In more detail the Wegman–Carter 
multiple-message authentication scheme uses a small ran-
dom key to produce a message-dependent ‘tag’ (rather like 
a check sum) for an arbitrarily large message, in such a 
way that an eavesdropper ignorant of the key has only 
a small probability of being able to generate any other 
valid message–tag pairs. The tag thus provides evidence 
that the message is legitimate, and was not generated or 
altered by someone ignorant of the key. (Key bits are grad-
ually used up in the Wegman–Carter scheme, and cannot 
be reused without compromising the system’s provable se-
curity; however, in the present application, these key bits 
can be replaced by fresh random bits successfully trans-
mitted through the quantum channel.) The eavesdropper 
can still prevent communication by suppressing messages 
in the public channel, as of course he can by suppress-
ing or excessively perturbing the photons sent through the 
quantum channel. However, in either case, Alice and Bob 
will conclude with high probability that their secret com-
munications are being suppressed, and will not be fooled 
into thinking their communications are secure when in 
fact they’re not.
IV. Quantum coin tossing
‘Coin Flipping by Telephone’ was ﬁrst discussed by 
Blum [Bl]. The problem is for two distrustful parties, com-
municating at a distance without the help of a third party, 
to come to agree on a winner and a loser in such a way 
that each party has exactly 50 percent chance of winning. 
Any attempt by either party to bias the outcome should be 
detected by the other party as cheating. Previous protocols 
for this problem are based on unproved assumptions in 
computational complexity theory, which makes them vul-
nerable to a breakthrough in algorithm design.
By contrast, we present here a scheme involving classi-
cal and quantum messages which is secure against tradi-
tional kinds of cheating, even by an opponent with unlim-
ited computing power. Ironically, it can be subverted by a 
still subtler quantum phenomenon, the so-called Einstein–
Podolsky–Rosen effect. This threat is merely theoretical, 
because it requires perfect eﬃciency of storage and detec-
tion of photons, which though not impossible in principle 
is far beyond the capabilities of current technology. The 
honestly-followed protocol, on the other hand, could be re-
alized with current technology.
1. Alice chooses randomly one basis (say rectilinear) and 
a sequence of random bits (one thousand should be 
suﬃcient). She then encodes her bits as a sequence 
of photons in this same basis, using the same coding 
scheme as before. She sends the resulting train of po-
larized photons to Bob.
2. Bob chooses, independently and randomly for each 
photon, a sequence of reading bases. He reads the pho-
tons accordingly, recording the results in two tables, 
one of rectilinearly received photons and one of diag-
onally received photons. Because of losses in his de-
tectors and in the transmission channel, some of the 
photons may not be received at all, resulting in holes 
in his tables. At this time, Bob makes his guess as to 
which basis Alice used, and announces it to Alice. He 
wins if he guessed correctly, loses otherwise.
3. Alice reports to Bob whether he won, by telling him 
which basis she had actually used. She certiﬁes this 
information by sending Bob, over a classical channel, 
her entire original bit sequence used in step 1.
4. Bob veriﬁes that no cheating has occurred by compar-
ing Alice’s sequence with both his tables. There should 
be perfect agreement with the table corresponding to 
Alice’s basis and no correlation with the other table. In 
our example, Bob can be conﬁdent that Alice’s original 
basis was indeed rectilinear as claimed.
Illustrating the protocol by a speciﬁc example, we have
Alice’s bit string . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
Alice’s random basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rectilinear
Photons Alice sends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ↔  ↔ ↔    ↔  ↔   ↔ ↔
Bob’s random bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R D D D R R D R R D R R D D R
Bob’s rectilinear table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 0 0
Bob’s diagonal table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 1 0
Bob’s guess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ‘Rectilinear’
‘You win’Alice’s reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alice sends her original bit string to certify ‘ 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 ’
Bob’s rectilinear table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 0 0
Bob’s diagonal table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 1 0
In order to cheat, Bob would need to guess Alice’s basis 
with probability greater than 1/2. This amounts to dis-
tinguishing a train of photons randomly polarized in one 
basis from a train randomly polarized in another basis. 
However, it can be shown that any measuring apparatus 
capable of making this distinction can also be used, in 
conjunction with the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen effect de-
scribed below, to transmit useful information faster than 
the speed of light, in violation of well-established physical 
laws.
Alice could attempt cheating either at step 1 or step 3. 
Let us ﬁrst assume that she follows step 1 honestly and 
ﬁnds herself losing at the end of step 2, because Bob made 
the correct guess, here rectilinear. In order to pretend she 
has won, she would need to convince Bob that her photons 
were diagonally polarized, which she can only do by pro-
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diagonal table. This she cannot do reliably because this ta-
ble is the result of probabilistic behavior of the photons 
after they left her hands. Suppose she goes ahead anyway 
and sends Bob a new ‘original’ sequence, different from the 
one that she used in step 1, in the hope that it will by luck 
agree perfectly with Bob’s diagonal table. This attempt to 
cheat requires Alice to be not only lucky but daring, be-
cause in the vast majority of cases, the gamble would fail 
and would be detected as cheating. By contrast, in tradi-
tional coin-tossing schemes, analogous attempts to seize a 
lucky victory from the jaws of defeat, though unlikely to 
succeed, are unaccompanied by any danger of detection.
It is easy to see that things are even worse for Alice if 
she attempts to cheat in step 1 by sending a mixture of 
rectilinear and diagonal photons, or photons which are po-
larized neither rectilinearly or diagonally. In this case she 
will not be able to agree with either of Bob’s tables in 
step 3, since both tables will record the results of prob-
abilistic behavior not under her control.
In order to say how Alice can cheat using quantum me-
chanics it is necessary to describe the Einstein–Podolsky–
Rosen (EPR) effect [Bo,AGR], often called a paradox because 
it contradicts the common-sense notion that for two in-
dividually random events happening at distance from one 
another to be correlated, some physical inﬂuence must 
have propagated from the earlier event to the later, or else 
from some common random cause to both events.
The EPR effect occurs when certain types of atom or 
molecule decay with the emission of two photons, and 
consists of the fact that the two photons are always found 
to have opposite polarization, regardless of the basis used 
to observe them, provided both are observed in the same 
basis. For example, if both photons are measured rectilin-
early, it will always be found that one is horizontal and the 
other vertical, though which is horizontal will vary ran-
domly from one decay to the next. If both photons are 
measured diagonally, one will always be 135-degree and 
the other 45-degree. A moment’s reﬂection will show that 
this behavior cannot be explained by assuming the de-
cay produces a distribution over α of oppositely polarized 
(α and α + 90) photons, since, in that case, if such a pair 
of photons were measured in an intermediate basis (say 
α+45), both would behave probabilistically so as to some-
times come out with the same polarization.
Probably the simplest, but paradoxical-sounding, ver-
bal explanation of the EPR effect is to say that the two 
photons are produced in an initial state of undeﬁned po-
larization; and when one of them is measured, the measur-
ing apparatus forces it to choose a polarization (choosing 
randomly and equiprobably between the two character-
istic directions offered by the apparatus) while simulta-
neously forcing the other unmeasured photon, no matter 
how far away, to choose the opposite polarization. This 
implausible-sounding explanation is supported by formal 
quantum mechanics, which represents the state of a pair of photons as a vector in a 4-dimensional Hilbert space ob-
tained by taking the tensor product of two 2-dimensional 
Hilbert spaces. The EPR state produced by the decay is 
described by the vector 0.7071(r1r2 − r2r1), and the EPR 
effect is explained by the fact that this vector has anticor-
related projections into the 2-dimensional Hilbert spaces 
of the two photons no matter what basis is used to express 
the tensor product (e.g. the same state vector is demon-
strably equal to 0.7071(d1d2 −d2d1), and to 0.7071(c1c2 −
c2c1)).
In order to cheat, Alice produces a number of EPR 
photon-pairs instead of individual random photons in 
step 1. In each case she sends Bob one member of the 
pair and stores the other herself, perhaps between per-
fectly reﬂecting mirrors. When Bob makes his guess (e.g. 
rectilinear) she then measures all her stored photons in 
the opposite (diagonal) basis, thereby obtaining results 
perfectly correlated with his diagonal table but uncorre-
lated with his rectilinear table. She then announces these 
results, pretending them to be the random bits she was 
supposed to have encoded in the photons in step 1, and 
thereby forces a win from which Bob cannot escape even 
by delaying his measurements until after his guess. This 
cheat requires that Alice be able to store the twin pho-
tons for a considerable time and then measure them with 
high detection eﬃciency, and thus would be possible only 
in principle, not in practice. Any photons lost by Alice dur-
ing storage or measurement would result in holes in her 
pretended bit sequence, which she would have to ﬁll by 
guessing, and these guesses would risk detection by Bob if 
they failed to agree with his tables.
Appendix A. Supplementary material
A scan of the original manuscript of this paper, which 
became known as BB84, is available as supplementary ma-
terial. It can be found online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.tcs.2014.05.025.
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